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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay is Part Two of  a two-part essay series that outlines and 
evaluates two possible future international instruments.1 Each proposed 
future international instrument draws substantial inspiration from both the 
Cape Town Convention,2 and in particular, its Aircraft Protocol.3 In 
addition to both the Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Protocol, this 
Essay will address components of  any other Protocol that might enter into 
force in the future.4 (For convenience, unless otherwise noted or implied 
from the context, subsequent references to “Cape Town” refer to the Cape 
Town Convention, the Aircraft Protocol, and other such Protocols together 
that might enter into force in the future. More specific references to the 
“Convention” or a particular “Protocol” refer in particular to the identified 
instruments.) This Introduction first will provide background on Cape 
Town then outline the two possible future projects.5 It will begin by 
summarizing the project presented in Part One of  the essay series.6 Part 
One assessed the first project on its merits as well as its feasibility from 
                                                          
1. For present purposes, I use “international instruments” in the broadest sense to include 
commentary, model laws, international conventions, and any other texts generated through 
international organizations.  
2. International Institute for the Unification of  Private Law [UNIDROIT], Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10 (2003), 2307 
U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Convention]. 
3. UNIDROIT, Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10 (2003) 
[hereinafter Aircraft Protocol]. 
4. Two additional protocols for rail and space equipment have been adopted, but neither has yet 
come into force. See UNIDROIT, Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets, Mar. 9, 2012 [hereinafter Space Protocol], available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/spaceassets-protocol-e.pdf; 
UNIDROIT, Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock, Feb. 23, 2007 [hereinafter Rail Protocol], 
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/railprotocol.pdf. The 
Convention provides procedures for the adoption of  future protocols covering additional categories 
of  mobile equipment. Convention, supra note 2, art. 51. 
5. Much of  this overview derives from the Introduction to Part One and from Charles W. Mooney, 
Jr., The Cape Town Convention: A New Era for Aircraft Financing, AIR & SPACE LAW., Summer 2003, at 4. 
6. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Cape Town Convention’s Improbable-but-Possible Progeny Part One: An 
International Secured Transactions Registry of  General Application, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 163 (2014) [hereinafter 
Mooney, Jr., Part One]. 
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practical and political perspectives. Part Two will take the same approach in 
presenting and analyzing the second possible future project. 
The Convention and the Aircraft Protocol were opened for signature on 
November 16, 2001, following a diplomatic conference in Cape Town.7 
While the Convention contains the basic legal regime for secured financing 
and leasing of  equipment, the Aircraft Protocol consists of  specialized 
provisions adapting the Convention for financing and leasing of  aircraft 
and aircraft engines. 
The Convention and the Aircraft Protocol provide a legal regime for 
security interests (“international interests”) in large airframes, aircraft 
engines, and helicopters. The scope of  the Convention’s international 
interest embraces the interests of  a lessor and a conditional seller of  an 
aircraft object.8 The Convention and Aircraft Protocol also apply to 
contracts of  sale.9  
At the time the Convention project began, domestic legal systems in 
many states were inadequate to support secured, asset-based financing. 
Absent reforms, some transactions could not occur at all; some could only 
be consummated with higher financing costs; and still others could only be 
accomplished with the credit support of  a state’s sovereign obligations.10 
The Convention and Aircraft Protocol offer the necessary reforms to 
overcome the inadequacies of  domestic regimes and have both been 
enormously successful. Both the Convention and Aircraft Protocol entered 
into force on March 1, 2006.11 The Convention has been adopted by sixty-
                                                          
7. ROY GOODE, THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT 
AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT: OFFICIAL 
COMMENTARY 1 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY]. The successful 
conclusion of  the conference was aided immensely, both leading up to and during the conference 
itself, by the Aviation Working Group (AWG). The AWG is a group of  major aerospace 
manufacturers and financial institutions organized by Jeffrey Wool. Id. at 5–6. (For more information 
on the AWG, see AVIATION WORKING GROUP, www.awg.aero (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).) Jeffrey 
Wool is the Secretary General of  the AWG; the Condon-Falknor Professor of  Global Business Law, 
University of  Washington; Senior Research Fellow, Harris Manchester College, University of  Oxford; 
and Head of  Aerospace Law and Policy, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. He also is the Executive 
Director of  the Cape Town Convention Academic Project, General Editor of  the Cape Town Convention 
Journal, and Chair of  the Advisory Board to the International Registry under the Aircraft Protocol. 
8. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1(i), 1(o), 2 (defining “creditor,” defining “international interest,” 
and outlining the scope of  an international interest, respectively). 
9. Id. art. 41; Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. III. 
10. GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 13. 
11. Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 2001) — Status, UNIDROIT, 
http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Convention —
Status]; Status — Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to 
Aircraft Equipment, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown-aircraft (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Aircraft Protocol — Status]. 
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six Contracting States, including the United States and the European 
Union, and the Aircraft Protocol by fifty-eight.12 
The success of  both instruments, in particular that of  the Aircraft 
Protocol’s international registry, inspired the development of  the first 
future international instrument outlined in Part One. Part One 
contemplated the creation of  a new international registry, where each 
adopting state would agree that the new registry would provide that state’s 
domestic secured transactions registry under that state’s domestic law.13  
The second project, as explained in this Essay (Part Two), contemplates 
an international instrument that would be available for adoption and use 
only by Cape Town’s Contracting States and only in connection with Cape 
Town. The second project would involve an amendment of  Cape Town 
under which adopting Contracting States would agree to binding arbitration 
for the benefit of  investors (i.e., in Convention terminology, “creditors”)14 
for the purpose of  enforcing the Contracting States’ obligations under 
Cape Town. This enforcement mechanism would be patterned on those 
that have become common under various bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs)15 and certain other international investment agreements (IIAs).16 
Such a mechanism is often referred to as an investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) or investor-state arbitration.17 
The proposal for an ISDS presented here is tentative. The goal of  this 
Essay will be to provide sufficient background, analysis, and structure to 
support the initiation of  an informed discussion that would provide for 
serious consideration of  the proposal for a Cape Town ISDS. In addition 
to the specific proposal for incorporation into Cape Town, this Essay will 
                                                          
12. Convention — Status, supra note 11; Aircraft Protocol — Status, supra note 11. Note that the 
European Union’s adoption extends only to matters on which it has competency, which is quite 
limited. As to other matters, European Union members have competency to adopt the Convention. 
See Declarations Lodged by the European Union Under the Cape Town Convention at the Time of  
the Deposit of  Its Instrument of  Accession, Apr. 28, 2009, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown?id=1658.  
13. See Mooney, Jr., Part One, supra note 6. 
14. Under the Convention, the term “creditor” means a chargee (under a security agreement), a 
lessor (under a leasing agreement), or a conditional seller (under a title reservation agreement). 
Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(i).  
15. The BITs entered into by the United States are typical in this respect. See United States Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2015) (listing the BITs to which the United States is a party). 
16. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty arts. 26–28, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 
(discussing investor-state dispute resolution provisions under a multilateral framework for 
energy cooperation). 
17. Part II.A.3.b. of  this Essay will consider whether the creditors that would be entitled to utilize 
the arbitration mechanism should be limited to those located in a Contracting State other than the 
Contracting State that has (or is alleged to have) failed to comply with its Convention obligations (i.e., 
limited to “foreign” creditors). 
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seek to introduce more generally the idea of  incorporating ISDS into 
transnational commercial law instruments.18 
I. OPERATION AND BENEFITS OF THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION: 
CENTRALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION AND  
COMPLIANCE BY CONTRACTING STATES 
A. Contracting State Compliance and the Underlying Economic Assumptions of  
Cape Town 
Cape Town is about lowering the costs of  financing and leasing aircraft 
through embracing modern principles of  asset-based financing. As 
explained by Saunders et al. in their 1999 study of  aircraft financing (the 
“1999 Study”): 
The key principles underlying the lender’s ability to extend asset-
based financing are that a financier or lessor: (1) should be able to 
determine and assure itself  that its proprietary interest in a financed 
or leased asset is superior to all potential competing claims against 
that asset; (2) upon default, will be able to promptly realize the 
value of  the asset and/or redeploy that asset for purposes of  
generating proceeds/revenues to be applied against amounts owed; 
and (3) will not have their rights described in (1) and (2) above 
qualified or modified in the context of  bankruptcy or insolvency. In 
this study, such principles shall be referred to as the “asset-based 
financing principles.” 
Whether a legal system or law reform initiative embodies asset-
based financing principles and is economically valuable depends 
crucially on three key factors: (1) the quality and transparency of  
the registry of  property interests; (2) the speed with which legal 
enforcement is available; and (3) the ability to enforce contractual 
rights when a borrower or lessee is bankrupt or insolvent.19 
                                                          
18. While the statement in the text is accurate, on September 6, 2014, I discovered that Brian 
Havel and John Mulligan, in a since-published draft paper, explored the question whether existing 
BITs could be employed to provide remedies for a creditor against a Contracting State that fails to 
comply with its Cape Town obligations. Brian F. Havel & John Q. Mulligan, The Cape Town Convention 
and the Risk of  Renationalization: A Comment in Reply to Jeffrey Wool and Andrej Jonovic, 2014 CAPE TOWN 
CONVENTION J. 81. The authors prepared the draft paper for presentation at the Cape Town 
Academic Project Third Conference, held September 9–10, 2014, at the University of  Oxford. As 
explained below, in my view a targeted ISDS designed specifically for Cape Town would be the best 
approach. See infra Part II.A.3.a. of  this Essay. Based on conversations during that conference, it seems 
that the authors were unaware of  my work on this project, although I distributed slides explaining the 
proposal to a large number of  academics and others in February 2014. 
19. Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic Implications of  International Secured Transactions Law Reform: 
A Case Study, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 309, 316–17 (1999) [hereinafter Saunders et al., 1999 Study] 
(footnotes omitted). 
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This Essay focuses on the second and third principles of  asset-based 
financing mentioned in the passage above — prompt rights to enforcement 
and relief  coupled with enforceability in insolvency proceedings. If  the 
courts and officials of  a Contracting State do not provide the relief  on 
default and treatment in insolvency proceedings promised by Cape Town 
then the benefits of  lower-cost financing will not become available. Stated 
more precisely, achieving these benefits depends on ex ante confidence by 
potential creditors that, should the occasion of  default or insolvency arise, 
the mechanisms provided by Cape Town will be available and effective. 
The 1999 Study concluded that the adoption and effective 
implementation of  the Convention and Aircraft Protocol would produce 
estimated economic gains of  several billion dollars annually.20 Note that 
this conclusion is qualified by the condition that the Convention and 
Aircraft Protocol be “effectively implemented.”21 The study further 
concluded that “[t]hese gains will be widely shared among airlines and 
manufacturers, their employees, suppliers, shareholders, and customers, as 
well as the national economies in which they are located.”22 A more recent 
study by Vadim Linetsky (the “2009 Study”) highlights similar results by 
focusing on reductions in post-default repossession delays afforded by the 
implementation of  Cape Town.23 That study estimated that savings 
attributable solely to reducing post-default repossession delay from ten 
months to two months would amount to $161 billion between 2009 and 
2030.24 The 2009 Study’s conclusions, as with the 1999 Study, are 
conditioned on the effective implementation of  Cape Town by 
Contracting States.25 
                                                          
20. Id. at 352. For a summary and analysis of  the 1999 Study, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency 
Law as Credit Enhancement: Insolvency-related Provisions of  the Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Equipment 
Protocol, 13 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 27 (2004) [hereinafter Mooney, Jr., Insolvency]. 
21. Saunders et al., 1999 Study, supra note 19, at 351. 
22. Id. at 352. 
23. VADIM LINETSKY, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE CAPE TOWN TREATY 2–4 (2009), available at 
http://www.awg.aero/assets/docs/economicbenefitsofCapeTown.pdf  [hereinafter LINETSKY, 2009 
STUDY]; see also VADIM LINETSKY, ACCESSION TO THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION BY THE UK: AN 
ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT STUDY 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.awg.aero/assets/docs/UKCTC%20Econ%20Impact%20Final%20Version.pdf  
(concluding that if  the United Kingdom acceded to, and implemented, the Convention and Aircraft 
Protocol with the Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft (ASU)-qualifying 
declarations (discussed infra Part I.B. of  this Essay), then (i) U.K.-based airlines would reduce funding 
costs for aircraft deliveries by 538 million–2,705 billion GBP over the next two decades; (ii) U.K. 
lenders and lessors would benefit from less risk; (iii) U.K. manufacturers would benefit from greater 
sales volume; and (iv) the U.K. flying public would benefit from better aircraft). 
24. LINETSKY, 2009 STUDY, supra note 23, at 2. 
25. Id. (“To produce maximum benefits, [Cape Town] must be effectively implemented, including 
all actions necessary to ensure that their provisions will be strictly and reliably enforced by national 
authorities. The study results are predicated on full implementation and compliance.”). 
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There is concrete evidence that Cape Town has lowered the costs of  
financing in connection with officially (i.e., state) supported credits for the 
sale or lease of  aircraft. Qualifying persons (operators, buyer/borrowers, or 
lessors) can receive a reduction of  up to ten percent of  the minimum 
premium rates (i.e., finance charges or the equivalent) provided in the 
Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft (ASU) which 
was established under the auspices of  the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).26 This is known as the “Cape Town 
Convention Discount” (CTC Discount).27 To qualify, the person must be 
located in a Cape Town-qualifying Contracting State. A qualifying 
Contracting State is one that has made certain insolvency- and 
enforcement-related “qualifying declarations” under the Convention and 
Aircraft Protocol.28 In addition to making the qualified declarations, a 
qualifying Contracting State must also “[h]ave implemented the Cape Town 
Convention, including the qualifying declarations, in its laws and 
regulations, as required, in such a way that the Cape Town Convention 
commitments are appropriately translated into national law.”29 As Jeffrey 
Wool has explained, “‘implementation’ of  a treaty means that it has the force 
of  national law, and in the case of  conflict, prevails over any inconsistent 
national law.”30 
By tying lower financing costs to the qualifying declarations and 
implementation of  the Convention, the ASU’s approach clearly 
contemplates that the declarations and implementation will lower the risks 
attendant to insolvency and default. The principal effects of  the insolvency-
related provisions of  the Convention and Aircraft Protocol do not ensure 
                                                          
26. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits, at Annex III, app. 2, arts. 35–54, OECD Doc. TAD/PG(2011)13 (Aug. 30, 
2011) [hereinafter ASU]. States participating in the ASU are Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European 
Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Id. art. 3. 
27. Id. arts. 34-1, 36. 
28. Id. arts. 35(b), 37(b), Annex 1. Annex 1, paragraphs 1–2, of  the ASU specify the “qualifying 
declarations” as: (i) remedies on insolvency (Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. XI (Alternative A) 
(with no more than a sixty calendar-day waiting period)), (ii) deregistration and export (Aircraft 
Protocol, supra note 3, art. XIII), (iii) choice of  law (Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. VIII), and (iv) 
either (a) non-judicial remedies (Convention, supra note 2, art. 54(2)), or (b) expedited court remedies 
(Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. X)). For an overview of  these provisions, see infra Part I.B. of  this 
Essay. Certain other declarations would be disqualifying. As part of  what constitutes “qualifying 
declarations,” Annex 1 also identifies the disqualifying declarations in its Article 3 as: (i) opting out of  
the application of  Convention Articles 13 and 43, unless a qualifying declaration under Convention 
Article 54(2) has been made; (ii) opting out of  Aircraft Protocol Article XXIV, which provides that the 
Convention supersedes the Rome Convention of  1933 as to aircraft; and (iii) making a declaration 
under Convention Article 54(1), which renders unavailable a chargee’s remedy of  leasing a 
charged object. 
29. ASU, supra note 26, app. 2, art. 38(c). 
30. Jeffrey Wool, Treaty Design, Implementation, and Compliance Benchmarking Economic Benefit — A 
Framework as Applied to the Cape Town Convention, 17 UNIFORM L. REV. 633, 640 (2012) [hereinafter 
Wool, Treaty Design] (emphasis in original). 
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effective enforcement in actual insolvency proceedings of  debtors; rather 
“the principal effects will take place outside bankruptcy in the form of  the 
facilitating financing that would be unavailable (or available only at a 
substantially higher cost) under the prevailing domestic legal regimes of  
many states.”31 
B. Insolvency- and Enforcement-Related Provisions of  Cape Town 
This Subpart provides an overview of  the principal Cape Town 
provisions and declarations that are the basis for the CTC Discount.32 
Article XI of  the Aircraft Protocol outlines a creditor’s remedies if  its 
debtor becomes insolvent.33 A Contracting State that is a debtor’s “primary 
insolvency jurisdiction”34 may use a declaration to opt for either 
“Alternative A” or “Alternative B,” or it may decide not to make a 
declaration at all.35 The adoption of  Alternative A is a 
qualifying declaration.36 
Alternative A closely resembles Section 1110 of  the United States 
Bankruptcy Code.37 Alternative A is more protective of  a creditor’s 
interests than Alternative B.38 For this reason, a declaration that applies 
Alternative A is a qualifying declaration under the ASU.39 Under Alternative 
A, the debtor’s “insolvency administrator”40 must give possession of  the 
relevant aircraft object to the creditor holding an international interest in 
                                                          
31. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency, supra note 20, at 39. 
32. For an excellent overview and analysis of  the Cape Town insolvency-related provisions, see 
Kristin van Zwieten, The Insolvency Provisions of  the Cape Town Convention and Protocols: Historical and 
Economic Perspectives, 2012 CAPE TOWN CONVENTION J. 53. 
33. Of  course, there are other important insolvency-related effects of  the Convention that apply 
regardless of  any declarations. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 2, art. 30(1) (providing that a registered 
international interest is effective in insolvency proceedings, subject to avoidance powers and rules of  
procedure mentioned in Convention, supra note 2, art. 30(3)). 
34. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. I(2)(n) (defining “primary insolvency jurisdiction” as “the 
Contracting State in which the centre of  the debtor’s main interests is situated”). 
35. Id. arts. XI(1) (stating Article XI applies only if  a declaration is made under Article XXX(3)), 
XXX(3) (listing declarations concerning Article XI); see infra note 38 (differentiating the alternatives). 
36. As mentioned above, in addition to a Contracting State affirmatively making the qualifying 
declarations it must not have made certain other declarations in order to be eligible for the Cape Town 
List. See ASU, supra note 26, arts 35(b), 37(b).  
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012). 
38. The Official Commentary describes Alternative A as the “‘hard’, or rule-based, version,” of  
Article XI and Alternative B as the “‘soft’, or discretion-based, version.” GOODE, OFFICIAL 
COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 458. 
39. As the Official Commentary explains: “Work in advance of  the diplomatic Conference 
identified this provision as the single most significant provision economically. If  the sound legal rights 
and protections embodied in the Convention and Aircraft Protocol are not available in the insolvency 
context, they are not available when they are most needed.” Id.  
40. Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(k) (defining “insolvency administrator” as ‘‘a person authorised 
to administer the reorganisation or liquidation, including one authorised on an interim basis, and 
includes a debtor in possession if  permitted by the applicable insolvency law’’). 
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the object before the expiration of  the “waiting period.”41 Instead of  
specifying a period of  time following the commencement of  insolvency 
proceedings, such as the sixty-day period provided by Section 1110, 
Alternative A permits a Contracting State, in its declaration, to specify the 
applicable ‘‘waiting period’’ that will apply when the Contracting State is a 
debtor’s primary insolvency jurisdiction.42 For a Contracting State’s 
declaration to be a qualifying declaration, it must specify a waiting period 
of  sixty days or less.43 However, as under Section 1110, if  the insolvency 
administrator or debtor ‘‘cure[s] all defaults . . . and has agreed to perform 
all future obligations under the agreement,’’ the insolvency administrator or 
debtor ‘‘may retain possession of  the aircraft object.’’44 
Both “de-registration of  the aircraft” (as a condition of  changing the 
nationality by re-registering it in another state)45 and “export and physical 
transfer of  the aircraft object from the territory in which it is situated” are 
remedies found in Article IX(1) which provide additional protections to a 
creditor when a debtor defaults.46 Related to and supplementing Article 
IX(1), a declaration by a Contracting State to apply Article XIII is another 
qualifying declaration under the ASU.47 Under that article, the debtor may 
issue an “irrevocable de-registration and export request authorisation” 
(IDERA) in substantially the form specified by the Aircraft Protocol and 
may submit the IDERA to the registry authority to be recorded.48 An 
IDERA authorizes a specified “authorized party” to “be the sole person 
entitled to exercise the remedies specified in Article IX(1).” As an 
“authorized party,” a creditor (or its designee, on its behalf) may exercise 
                                                          
41. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. XI(2) (Alternative A). 
42. Id. art. XI(3) (Alternative A). 
43. Of  the Contracting States that have adopted the Aircraft Protocol and made declarations as to 
Article XI, forty-two declared Alternative A as applicable, and one (Mexico) chose Alternative B. 
Aircraft Protocol — Status, supra note 11. Of  the Contracting States choosing Alternative A, most chose 
a sixty-day waiting period; one chose two months; one chose forty days; and eleven chose thirty days. 
Id. Inasmuch as Bankruptcy Code Section 1110 applies under United States law, the United States did 
not make a declaration concerning Article XI, thus opting for the continued applicability of  
Bankruptcy Code Section 1110 when the United States is the primary insolvency jurisdiction. Id. 
44. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. XI(7) (Alternative A). However, ‘‘a default constituted by 
the opening of  insolvency proceedings’’ need not be cured. Id. 
45. The Chicago Convention of  1944 governs the nationality of  an aircraft. Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
46. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. IX(1). 
47. See supra note 28; Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, arts. XIII(1) (stating Article XIII applies only 
if  a declaration is made under Article XXX(1)), XXX(1) (listing declarations concerning Article XIII). 
48. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, arts. I(o) (defining “registry authority” as “the national authority 
or the common mark registering authority, maintaining an aircraft register in a Contracting State and 
responsible for the registration and de-registration of  an aircraft in accordance with the Chicago 
Convention”), XIII(2) (explaining that if  “the debtor has issued an irrevocable de-registration and 
export request authorisation substantially in the form annexed to this Protocol and has submitted such 
authorisation for recordation to the registry authority, that authorisation shall be so recorded”). 
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the remedies of  de-registration, export, and physical transfer without 
further consent or agreement by the debtor. 
Another important qualifying declaration would make applicable Aircraft 
Protocol Article VIII, which provides that parties may agree as to the law 
that will govern their contractual rights and obligations.49 This qualifying 
declaration signals respect for party autonomy and provides the parties with 
additional ex ante certainty. 
Finally, either of  two additional qualifying declarations is necessary 
under the ASU for a Contracting State to be eligible for the Cape Town 
List. The first is a declaration under Convention Article 54(2) to the effect 
that remedies not expressly requiring application to a court can be exercised 
“without leave of  the court.”50 The second is a declaration that the 
Contracting State will apply Aircraft Protocol Article X (other than 
paragraph 5), dealing with timely remedies and specifying the time limits for 
purposes of  Article X(2) (“‘speedy’ . . . relief ”) as ten calendar days for 
certain remedies and thirty calendar days for others.51 
C. Contracting State Non-Compliance: Is There a Problem? 
This Subpart considers whether there is a need to provide a formal 
remedy for a Contracting State’s non-compliance with its Cape Town 
obligations. The paradigmatic setting for the analysis assumes that a 
Contracting State fails to comply with its obligations and thereby causes 
loss or damage to a creditor.52 It is such a creditor that would be entitled to 
assert a remedy against the Contracting State.  
When the Cape Town Convention enters into force in a Contracting 
State, the state “is bound by international law to perform its obligations 
under the Convention even if  this conflicts with national law.”53 A 
Contracting State could fail to comply with its obligations as a result of  
action or inaction of  its courts. For example, a court might fail to honor the 
parties’ choice of  applicable law under Aircraft Protocol Article VIII or fail 
to provide the timely relief  required by Alternative A of  Article XI. 
                                                          
49. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, arts. VIII(1) (stating Article VIII applies only if  a declaration is 
made under Article XXX(1)), XXX(1) (listing declarations concerning Article VIII). 
50. ASU, supra note 26, Annex 1, para. 2(d); Convention, supra note 2, art. 54(2). 
51. ASU, supra note 26, Annex 1, para. 2(e); Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, arts. X(1) (providing 
that Article X applies only if  a declaration is made under Article XXX(2)), XXX(2) (declarations 
concerning Article X). 
52. Given this setting, the following discussion does not contemplate that a Contracting State’s 
failure to implement Cape Town would be an independent, freestanding instance of  non-compliance 
for which a creditor would be entitled to a remedy. In the case of  such a failure, it would be difficult or 
impossible to determine in the abstract any creditor’s loss or damage resulting from the ineffectiveness 
of  the state’s adoption of  Cape Town. Of  course, a failure to implement could be a cause of  non-
compliance for which a creditor could be entitled to a remedy. 
53. GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 19. 
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Alternatively, a Contracting State might be in breach of  its obligations if  
the relevant officials failed to provide the required de-registration and 
export and physical transfer permission under Aircraft Protocol Articles IX 
and XIII. In these cases, it is important to distinguish between intentional 
violations of  a Contracting State’s Convention obligations and 
misinterpretation or misapplication of  the applicable rule. This dichotomy 
contemplates, for example, that there is a meaningful difference between a 
court’s or official’s mistake while acting in good faith and a court’s or 
official’s (and thereby a Contracting State’s) non-compliance with clear 
international obligations under Cape Town.54 
Consider an example. Articles 35, 36, and 37 of  the Convention55 
provide an ingenious approach that incorporates the priority rules and 
effects of  insolvency applicable to international interests (Convention 
Articles 29 and 3056) and applies those rules to assignments of  “associated 
rights.”57 These assignment-related provisions work well, but they are 
compact and subtle. Fortunately, the Official Commentary provides clear 
guidance on how to apply these rules and on how to parse the subtlety that 
exists.58 Nonetheless, it is easy to imagine that a court could interpret these 
provisions incorrectly, perhaps as a result of  its lack of  sophistication or 
because of  a lawyer’s poor argumentation. One might imagine the same 
with respect to other provisions as well, including the Convention’s baseline 
priority rules found in Articles 29 and 30.59 
A Contracting State’s non-compliance with Convention obligations 
could arise from a variety of  causes. One cause might be that the state 
failed to implement the Convention such that it became the state’s national 
law and achieved primacy over other conflicting national law. Similarly, if  
the Convention has not been translated into the language used by the state’s 
courts, as a practical matter the courts would not be in a position to apply 
its provisions. Even if  the Convention has been fully implemented, 
inadequate resources, weaknesses in institutional frameworks, and lack of  
                                                          
54. As discussed below, however, I do not underestimate the difficulties of  drawing such a line 
between the two. See infra Part II.A.3.a. of  this Essay. 
55. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 35–37 (application of priority and insolvency rules to 
assignments). 
56. Id. arts. 29–30 (priority and insolvency rules for international interests in aircraft objects). 
57. Id. art. 1(c) (defining “associated rights” as “all rights to payment or other performance by a 
debtor under an agreement which are secured by or associated with the object”). 
58. GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 360–71. 
59. The non-compliance and remedy considered here do not contemplate that every time a 
creditor is dissatisfied with a determination made by a court or an official of  a Contracting State the 
creditor would be entitled to “relitigate” the matter in the context of  a remedy for non-compliance. I 
return to this issue in the context of  discussing the type or types of  non-compliance for which a 
remedy might be fashioned. See infra Part II.A.3.a. of  this Essay. 
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ready access to the courts could account for delays in providing creditors 
with Convention remedies.60 
Returning to the question raised above, is non-compliance with Cape 
Town obligations by Contracting States a problem in reality? Writing in 
2012 and recognizing that Cape Town is a relatively new treaty,61 Wool 
argued for a “strong” presumption of  state compliance with international 
commercial treaties generally,62 and more recently a “fairly strong” 
presumption of  the same.63 The special circumstances in the case of  Cape 
Town should “significantly increase compliance incentives.”64 Such a 
presumption would reflect the market’s confidence in compliance so as to 
support the lower costs of  financing and leasing that Cape 
Town contemplates. 
Wool has argued that a Contracting State’s non-compliance with Cape 
Town obligations would be costly, and he noted several factors that make 
non-compliance less likely. First, the ASU provides a proxy for enforcement 
of  Cape Town obligations inasmuch as non-compliance would impose on a 
Contracting State ineligibility (or loss of  eligibility) for the Cape Town 
List.65 Second, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a 
                                                          
60. See van Zwieten, supra note 32, at 75. 
More difficult perhaps may be implementation challenges that are attributed to 
resource constraints or other generalized weaknesses in a contracting state’s 
institutional framework. . . . [T]he core insolvency provision of  the Protocols 
may require an application to an insolvency court for approval of  the exercise of  
a default remedy . . . . The extent to which such applications can be successfully 
insulated, for example, from a generalised problem of  delay in courts or in the 
offices of  state-employed insolvency administrators is unclear. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). As I understand the import of  this passage, van Zwieten uses 
“implementation challenges” to include non-compliance, not “implementation” in the more technical 
sense explained above. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
61. Wool, Treaty Design, supra note 30, at 646 (“CTC is a new treaty system. It does not apply to 
transactions that closed prior to entry into force in Contracting States. There have, therefore, been few 
examples of  formal legal action governed by the CTC.”). 
62. Id. at 647 n.34 (emphasis omitted). 
[T]he presumption of  compliance should be strong in all Contracting States that 
(i) present low levels of  country/political risk, (ii) have a sound history of  
complying with treaty obligations, or (iii) have actually complied with a subject 
treaty. If  a Contracting State does not comply in actuality, that presumption 
should be reversed pending its taking transparent and binding corrective action, 
correlating with the facts giving rise to the non-compliance. 
Id. The “presumption of  compliance” to which Wool refers is the presumption that a prospective 
creditor should rationally make with respect to a Contracting State’s future compliance. 
63. Jeffrey Wool, Compliance with Transnational Commercial Law Treaties — A Framework as Applied to 
the Cape Town Convention, 2014 CAPE TOWN CONVENTION J. 5, 14 n.43 [hereinafter Wool, Compliance] 
(emphasis omitted). 
64. Wool, Treaty Design, supra note 30, at 643. The “specific circumstances” include the distinct 
benefits of  a state’s qualifying for the Cape Town List. Wool did note that the AWG would be 
“undertaking a major project monitoring, summarising, and evaluating all” actions in which Cape 
Town remedies are asserted. Id. at 646. 
65. Id. at 647. 
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co-sponsor, with the International Institute for the Unification of  Private 
Law (UNIDROIT), of  Cape Town, and ICAO has “a long-standing 
compliance culture” in which non-compliance would impose “substantial 
political costs.”66 Third, because Cape Town is a part of  investment law, 
non-compliance would send a negative signal as to a Contracting State’s 
investment climate and would “adversely impact its position in competing 
for foreign investment.”67 Finally, ongoing efforts to promote a culture of  
strict compliance through transparency and publicity will “increase the 
reputational costs on non-compliance.”68 To this list one might add that 
non-compliance could negatively affect assessments by rating agencies in 
respect of  debt securities secured by aircraft equipment.69 Additionally, by 
making the response system “more timely, interactive, and transparent” 
under the ASU, non-compliance becomes more costly.70 He further noted 
that steps are being taken “to minimise the risk, severity, and length of  
unintentional non-compliance.”71  
Notwithstanding these factors, there are concrete examples of  states’ 
non-compliance with their Convention obligations. For example, Donald 
G. Gray and Auriol Marasco explain that:  
After GE Capital Aviation Services Ltd. (GECAS) attempted to 
terminate a lease with Air Midwest Nigeria (Air Midwest) for certain 
defaults, and repossess its aircraft, Air Midwest brought an action 
before the Federal High Court in Nigeria against GECAS to prevent 
the termination of  the lease and subsequent repossession of  the 
aircraft. The alarming part about this action and the resulting 
decision is that it only casually references the Convention and only in 
respect to whether Air Midwest, having no proprietary rights in the 
aircraft, could rely on the Convention to its benefit. The Nigerian 
court’s decision considered neither this argument nor the 
Convention, and, instead, because parallel proceedings had been 
commenced in England, the court determined that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the case. While the decision ultimately led to a 
                                                          
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 648. 
69. See van Zwieten, supra note 32, at 73 (discussing the influence of  the Convention on the rating 
of  securities backed by aircraft equipment). 
70. Wool, Compliance, supra note 63, at 25. Significantly, Wool summarized specific proposals for 
these enhancements. Id. at 26–28 (outlining enhancements to improve the processes for loss and re-
acquisition of  eligibility for the CTC discount and for the active use and searching of  compliance-
based databases). 
71. Id. at 25.  
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favorable outcome for GECAS, it did not establish a helpful 
precedent.72 
In Wool’s more recent article, he notes that public data on such non-
compliance is limited.73 Not only is Cape Town a relatively new treaty 
system but much of  the Cape Town-related governmental activities are 
administrative in nature, not judicial, explaining at least in part the dearth 
of  data.74 Based on the available data, Wool has found that non-
implementation-based non-compliance deals mainly with recording and 
enforcement issues related to IDERAs and to government-asserted non-
consensual rights or interests.75 As to the IDERAs, “there have been limited 
instances of  unintentional non-compliance.”76 
Putting aside these discrete examples of  non-implementation-based non-
compliance and assuming arguendo that they are highly aberrational, in 2012 
Wool recognized that implementation problems have also produced a 
number of  instances of  non-compliance in some Contracting States.77 So 
long as the Convention has not been implemented in a Contracting State 
then it is likely that the Convention remedies would not be available in that 
state. This could happen either by the state failing to make the Convention 
a part of  its national law or by not affording it priority when it conflicts 
with other national laws. This failure to implement creates a latent or 
                                                          
72. Donald G. Gray & Auriol Marasco, The Cape Town Convention: Where is Canada?, AIR & SPACE 
LAW., 2011, at 1, 20 (citing Air Midwest Nigeria and Capt. Victor Aigbokhan v. Boeing 737-500 
Aircraft with Serial No. 27354, GE Capital Aviation Services Ltd. & Celestial Aviation Trading 21 Ltd., 
[2010], FHC/IK/CS/14/2010 (Nigeria)); see also van Zwieten, supra note 32, at 74 n.173 (“There is . . . 
a report of  some resistance by Nigerian courts to the exercise of  repossession rights by aircraft 
lessors . . . .”); NCAA Appeals to Judges on Injunctions Against Airline Operators, DAILY INDEP. 
(Apr. 20, 2012), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120610224445/http://dailyindependentnig.com/2012/04/ncaa-
appeals-to-judges-on-injunctions-against-airline-operators/ (observing that defaulting airline operators 
are seeking injunctions against repossession by airline operators, contrary to the Convention); Wool, 
Treaty Design, supra note 30, at 646 (“[A]n initial compliance problem occurred in a particular country, 
but a second CTC action [asserting remedies] in that same country was handled more promptly.”). 
73. Wool, Compliance, supra note 63, at 22–23. 
74. Id. He also pointed out that the Cape Town Convention Academic Project (CTCAP) is 
establishing databases on both judicial and administrative activity. Id.  
75. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(s) (defining “non-consensual right or interest” as “a right or 
interest conferred under the law of  a Contracting State which has made a declaration under Article 39 
to secure the performance of  an obligation, including an obligation to a State, State entity or an 
intergovernmental or private organisation”). Wool further observes that “[t]o our knowledge, there 
have been no CTC reported actions involving attempts at physical repossession or sale or the 
treatment of  CTC rights in insolvency proceedings.” Wool, Compliance, supra note 63, at 23. 
76. Wool, Compliance, supra note 63, at 23 (emphasis in original). 
77. Wool, Treaty Design, supra note 30, at 646 (“Experience has been mixed on implementation of  
the CTC. There have been problems in a substantial number of  Contracting States.”); Id. at 645 n.29 
(observing that not all of  the Contracting States that have made the qualifying declarations have 
implemented Cape Town). 
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potential non-compliance that would ripen if  and when the state was called 
upon to perform its Convention obligations.78 
In his recent update on implementational compliance and non-
compliance, Wool observed that although the situation has been “varied,” 
“the trajectory is broadly positive.”79 The implementation problems do not 
usually occur because of  failure to incorporate the Convention into 
national law, but rather from failure to afford it primacy over conflicting 
national law.80 Specifically Wool notes that “there have been significant 
problems in a substantial minority of  contracting states.”81 These problems 
generally have arisen as a result of  the absence of  necessary general 
legislation or the absence of  necessary specific Cape Town-
related regulations.82 
One can only guess whether over time these problems will be solved or 
exacerbated. It is possible that a few serious instances in which Contracting 
States fail to abide by their Cape Town obligations will undercut the 
presumption of  compliance and ultimately the confidence states have in the 
Cape Town system. Would the effects of  such isolated breaches be to 
penalize only (debtors in) offending Contracting States? Or, might they 
undermine confidence as to compliance more generally by Contracting 
States? Ultimately, I reach no conclusion here as to whether these examples 
of  actual and latent non-compliance are sufficiently serious so as to justify 
the creation, under the Cape Town auspices, of  an ISDS. At present there 
does not appear to be available the volume and quality of  data necessary to 
support a conclusion one way or the other. Hopefully, the ongoing 
monitoring, evaluation, data collection, and education under the auspices 
of  the AWG and the Cape Town Convention Academic Project will 
provide additional insights and understanding in the future.83 
At this time, Wool does not favor the adoption of  additional legal 
consequences for non-compliance. He considers such a step to be 
unnecessary given the ongoing progress in promoting compliance and the 
                                                          
78. This latent non-compliance is in addition to non-compliance consisting solely of  the state’s 
failure to implement. See supra note 52. 
79. Wool, Compliance, supra note 63, at 22; see also AVIATION WORKING GRP., CAPE TOWN 
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND ITS AIRCRAFT 
PROTOCOL: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION (2013), available at 
http://www.awg.aero/assets/docs/CTC-IP%20Summary%20Chart.pdf. 
80. Wool, Compliance, supra note 63, at 22. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 22. Havel and Mulligan identify a more insidious potential problem, future 
“renationalization” of  Cape Town through interpretation by domestic courts that would be influenced 
by local law. Havel & Mulligan, supra note 18, at 81–88. They cite experience with the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of  Goods (1980) (CISG). Id. at 89–90. Given the 
level of  specificity in the Cape Town texts when compared with that of  the CISG, I am 
less concerned. 
83. See Wool, Treaty Design, supra note 30, at 646; see also supra note 74. 
466 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 55:2 
costs associated with implementing new legal consequences.84 Although I 
hope that Wool’s position is correct and an ISDS for Cape Town is not 
necessary to ensure compliance, at this time the uncertainty of  the 
effectiveness of  the current legal framework in ensuring compliance means 
that a concrete proposal for remedying non-compliance should not be 
foreclosed at this stage of  the discussion. I address a number of  factors 
including costs and related issues below in discussing the feasibility of  
adopting an ISDS.85  
Perhaps implicit in Wool’s view is that proponents of  treaty revision 
should bear the burden of  persuasion as to necessity and cost effectiveness. 
I would not disagree, and I recognize that the question whether additional 
legal consequences should be adopted for non-compliance by Contracting 
States is, to my mind, a very difficult question. It is one on which informed 
observers reasonably can disagree with various levels of  (un)certainty. On 
the other hand, in my view, the failure to include an ISDS feature in Cape 
Town from the outset was a serious mistake. I regret that I must share in 
the blame for this failure.86 With hindsight, the issue of  non-compliance, 
including non-implementation, was entirely foreseeable. Unfortunately, the 
foreseeable was not foreseen in fact. 
An assessment of  the merits of  an ISDS mechanism for Cape Town 
may turn in part on the nature of  the system that would emerge. For this 
reason, Part II outlines how such an ISDS might be achieved and makes 
recommendations as to its scope and content. It proceeds on the working 
assumption that there are non-compliance problems that, at least, justify 
serious consideration of  the adoption of  an ISDS. 
II. THE PROPOSAL: AN AMENDMENT ON  
INVESTOR-STATE ENFORCEMENT 
A. Investor-State Enforcement: The BIT Model as Applied to  
Cape Town Transactions 
1. Cape Town Creditors as Investors 
In the past few decades, BITs have proliferated.87 The ISDS feature 
proposed here is based on the typical structure of  BITs. There have been 
                                                          
84. Wool, Compliance, supra note 63, at 26–27. 
85. See infra Part II.C. of  this Essay. 
86. Although I was a member of  the United States delegation and was its position coordinator, 
creditor-state enforcement never appeared on my radar screen. Of  course, I do recognize that in this 
failure I had some very distinguished company. 
87. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013: 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT, at ix, U.N. Sales No. 
E.13.II.D.5 (2013). 
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spirited political and academic debates over the merits of  BITs, and in 
particular their ISDS provisions; these debates continue.88 Whether or not 
BITs have succeeded, there appears to be general agreement as to what 
they are intended and supposed to achieve. The basic thesis is that by providing 
various protections for foreign investors, a BIT encourages investors 
situated in each state party to the treaty to invest in the other state.89 The 
BIT is designed to achieve this result by reducing the risks imposed on a 
foreign investor. For example, BIT investor protections that have become 
relatively standard include (i) protection of  foreign investments against 
expropriation or nationalization, including full compensation if  such an 
event occurs; (ii) permitting foreign investors to freely transfer capital, 
funds, profits, royalties, and personnel across borders; (iii) a requirement of  
                                                                                                                                       
By the end of  2012, the regime of  international investment agreements 
(IIAs) consisted of  3,196 treaties. Today, countries increasingly favour a 
regional over a bilateral approach to IIA rule making and take into account 
sustainable development elements. More than 1,300 of  today’s 2,857 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) will have reached their “anytime 
termination phase” by the end of  2013, opening a window of  opportunity 
to address inconsistencies and overlaps in the multi-faceted and multi-
layered IIA regime, and to strengthen its development dimension. 
Id. 
88. See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427 
(2010). Salacuse concludes that notwithstanding the benefits of  investment treaties for home states, 
the threats to the investment regime, which have been characterized as 
“clarion calls to roll back the foreign investment regime,” are real, and they 
may have the power to cause a divergence of  state expectations and thus 
undermine the regime that has been painstakingly constructed over the last 
sixty years.  
Id. at 473 (footnote omitted). As challenges for the investment regime, Salacuse identifies 
disappointing results in attracting investment to some states, questions about the fairness of  
investment arbitration and the constraints it puts on state sovereignty, the failure of  the investment 
regime to deliver the expected beneficial effects on economies, and the economic and political stress 
on states resulting from repeated financial crises. Id. at 468–70. 
89. See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of  
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67 (2005). The authors identify 
three principal purposes of  BITs: protection of  foreign direct investment (FDI), promotion of  FDI, 
and liberalization of  national economies stimulated by FDI. Id. at 75–78. They conclude that that BITs 
generally have been successful in reaching the goals of  protection, and thereby promotion, of  FDI. Id. 
at 90, 106–07, 111. As to economic liberalization, they conclude: 
BITs may also have an indirect positive effect on liberalization of  host 
country economies. Under certain circumstances, the introduction of  FDI 
can contribute to that liberalization. . . .  
Economic liberalization is a complex process that cannot be brought 
about by any single magic bullet. It requires a host of  sound policies, laws, 
and institutions across a wide domain of  human activity. BITs are just one 
policy instrument among many others that may facilitate the process.  
Id. at 94–95. For a different view, see Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign 
Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 438 (2011) (concluding 
“that BITs generally have little causal role in promoting foreign investment”). 
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fair and equitable treatment of  foreign investors; (iv) most favored nation 
(MFN) treatment, under which foreign investors must receive treatment no 
less favorable than that afforded to investors from any other state; and (v) 
national treatment, under which foreign investors must receive treatment 
no less favorable than that afforded its national, domestic investors.90 In 
addition, BITs typically have “teeth” to protect investors by providing that 
a state’s obligations under the BIT are enforceable under an ISDS.91 
Cape Town reflects precisely the same risk-reduction principle embodied 
in typical BITs. By reducing the risks that a creditor faces in entering into a 
secured financing or leasing transaction, Cape Town allows a debtor to 
obtain a lower-cost financing or lease. Like a BIT for investors, Cape 
Town’s risk-reduction approach provides inducements to a prospective 
creditor. The proposal here recognizes that Cape Town is indeed a form of  
investment treaty and that its economic rationale follows precisely the 
rationale under which states enter into BITs. Unlike the regime for 
investors under a typical BIT, however, Cape Town has no “teeth” allowing 
a creditor to enforce a Contracting State’s obligations. The proposal here 
would provide such an ISDS for Cape Town’s investors — creditors — for 
the purpose of  enforcing compliance with a Contracting State’s obligations. 
Inspired by the typical ISDSs under BITs,92 a noncomplying Contracting 
State would be subject to binding arbitration and liable for damages to an 
aggrieved creditor. 
2. The Cape Town Amendment Process 
The Convention and the Aircraft Protocol each contain an article in their 
final provisions on “Review Conferences, amendments and related 
matters.”93 Except for the internal references to the Convention or the 
Aircraft Protocol, as the case may be, each article is identical.94 Each 
provides for the convening of  a “Review Conference” if  requested by “not 
                                                          
90. See JEROLD A. FRIEDLAND, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 265–67 (3d ed. 2010). 
91. E.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea 
art. 22, U.S.-S. Kor., June 30, 2007. 
92. In one relevant respect, however, Cape Town differs from a BIT. Cape Town draws no 
distinctions based on the location or nationality of  a creditor whereas BITs normally protect only 
nationals of  the state parties. Part II.A.3.b. of  this Essay considers whether creditors that would be 
entitled to utilize an arbitration mechanism under Cape Town should be limited to those situated in a 
Contracting State other than the Contracting State that has (or is alleged to have) failed to comply with 
its Cape Town obligations (i.e., limited to “foreign” creditors). 
93. Convention, supra note 2, art. 61; Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. XXXVI. The 
corresponding provisions of  the Rail Protocol and the Space Protocol are identical and the following 
discussion applies equally to them. Rail Protocol, supra note 4, art. XXXIII; Space Protocol, supra note 
4, art. XLVII. 
94. There is one exception to the statement in the text, Convention Article 61(4), discussed below. 
See infra text accompanying note 99. 
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less than twenty-five [percent] of  the States Parties” to the Convention or 
Protocol.95 Among the matters to be considered by a Review Conference is 
“whether any modifications to this [Convention]/[Protocol] or the 
arrangements relating to the International Registry are desirable.”96 An 
amendment to the Convention or Aircraft Protocol must “be approved by 
at least a two-thirds majority of  States Parties participating in the 
Conference.”97 Even if  an amendment were approved, it would enter into 
force with respect to a state only upon that state’s ratification, acceptance, 
or approval of  the amendment.98 
Convention Article 61(4) provides that if  a proposed amendment would 
apply to more than one type of  equipment, approval requires a two-thirds 
majority of  states party to the relevant Protocol for such equipment and 
which are participating in the Review Conference.99 At the time of  this 
writing, Luxembourg is the only state party to the Rail Protocol100 and no 
state is a party to the Space Protocol.101 Hypothetically, were a vote 
conducted at a Review Conference today, amendments applicable to the 
Space Protocol would require a two-thirds majority of  participants and 
amendments applicable to the Rail Protocol would require such a two-
thirds majority that includes Luxembourg. 
As a conceptual matter there are other possible approaches for imposing 
a Cape Town ISDS that would not involve a Review Conference and 
amendment. For example, Contracting States could enter into a bilateral 
arrangement for enforcement. Alternatively, Contracting States party to a 
BIT could amend a BIT that is already in place to include the Cape Town 
obligations within its scope. However, both of  these methods have large 
transaction costs, would cause delay, and are unlikely to produce widespread 
adoption. Thus the amendment process seems by far a more 
straightforward and appealing approach. 
As should become apparent from the following discussion of  the scope 
and content of  an amendment, the amendment would involve highly 
technical aspects of  the Convention and the three Protocols. In my view, a 
successful project would require a study group of  experts, under the 
auspices of  UNIDROIT, to prepare the text of  the amendment in as close 
                                                          
95. Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(2); Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. XXXVI(2). 
96. Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(2)(d); Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. XXXVI(2)(d). 
97. Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(3); Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. XXXVI(3). 
98. Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(3); Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. XXXVI(3). 
99. Convention, supra note 2, art. 61(4). 
100. Status — Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/status-2007luxembourg-
rail (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).  
101. Status — UNIDROIT Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on 
Matters Specific to Space Assets, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/status-2012-space (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2015). 
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as possible to “final form” for submission to a Review Conference. Initially, 
a subgroup of  two or three individuals should be tasked with the 
preparation of  an initial draft. Additionally, the draft should be 
accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. 
3. Scope and Content of  the Amendment 
a. Scope: Covered Obligations 
It was suggested above that there should be a dichotomy between a 
Contracting State’s court or public official making a mistake, such as 
misinterpreting or misapplying Cape Town’s provisions, and a Contracting 
State’s non-compliance with its clear Cape Town obligations.102 The 
amendment and ISDS proposed here would provide remedies for an 
aggrieved creditor in the case of  the latter (non-compliance), but not in the 
case of  the former (a mistake). This approach would take account of  which 
risks creditors can be presumed to have assumed and which risks they 
should be protected from. 
Consider an example. Convention Article 11(1) provides that “[t]he 
debtor and the creditor may at any time agree in writing as to the events 
that constitute a default or otherwise give rise to the rights and remedies 
specified in Articles 8 to 10 and 13.”103 Creditors may be presumed to 
understand that they may need to use a court of  a Contracting State in 
order to assert the rights and remedies mentioned in Article 11 and that a 
court would condition the availability of  such rights and remedies upon the 
creditor establishing that a default has occurred. In that connection, a 
creditor also may be presumed to have accepted the risk that the court 
could disagree with the creditor’s view of  the facts and determine, contrary 
to the creditor’s position, that a default has not occurred.104 On the other 
hand, if  the court determines that no default has occurred because it will 
not honor the parties’ agreement as to what constitutes a default, then that 
would appear to be the sort of  risk that the creditor should not be 
presumed to have assumed. In the latter case, the proposed ISDS would be 
available to provide a remedy to the creditor. 
The dichotomy may not always be clear, which could present difficulties 
when trying to establish which risks are presumed to be assumed by a 
creditor. For that reason, the proposal calls for a precise identification of  a 
Contracting State’s Cape Town obligations as to which the ISDS would be 
                                                          
102. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
103. Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(1). 
104. See also supra text accompanying notes 55–59 (discussing the example of  mistakes or 
misinterpretations in the application of  Cape Town’s priority rules). 
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applicable.105 While I do not offer here a definitive listing of  these 
obligations, I do identify below the obligations or types of  obligations as to 
which serious consideration should be given for the applicability of  an 
ISDS. 
My tentative list of  enforceable obligations includes a Contracting State’s 
obligation to provide: 
(i) a creditor’s right to take possession of  an object in the event of  
default,106 and the additional remedies of  sale, lease, or collection afforded 
to a chargee;107 
(ii) a conditional seller’s or lessor’s right of  termination;108 
(iii) a chargee’s right of  vesting;109 
(iv) respect for the parties’ agreement as to a default or other trigger for 
rights and remedies;110 
(v) speedy relief  pending final determination;111 
(vi) respect for the parties’ agreement as to choice of  applicable law;112 
(vii) de-registration of  an aircraft and export and physical transfer of  an 
aircraft object;113 
(viii) modifications to speedy relief  pending final determination 
(when applicable);114 
(ix) remedies on insolvency (Alternative B, when applicable);115 
(x) insolvency assistance (when applicable);116 and 
(xi) all of  the OECD ASU qualifying declarations.117 
Before settling on which Cape Town obligations should be covered by 
an ISDS, more discussion is needed. Moreover, each potential enforceable 
obligation should be tested with hypothetical factual scenarios in order to 
assess how enforcement might (or might not) be effective in practice. Every 
effort should be made to ensure that the list of  covered obligations is not 
                                                          
105. Typically BITs provide broad principles against which specific facts must be evaluated in a 
myriad of  contexts and settings. Thus by outlining the specific Cape Town obligations which would 
trigger the ISDS applicability, the proposed scenario would be distinguishable from many of  the ISDS 
protocols employed by BITs. 
106. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8(1)(a) (chargee), 10(a) (conditional seller or lessor). 
107. Id. art. 8(1)(b)–(c). 
108. Id. art. 10(a). 
109. Id. art. 9(1). 
110. Id. art. 11(1). 
111. Id. art. 13. 
112. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, art. VIII. 
113. Id. arts. IX(1), XIII. 
114. Id. art. X. 
115. Id. art. XI (Alternative B). 
116. Id. art. XII. 
117. For a description and discussion of  the qualifying declarations, see supra Part I.C. of  
this Essay. 
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materially under- or over-inclusive. The foregoing list is presented solely as 
a starting point for discussion. 
This discussion highlights the uniqueness of  a Cape Town ISDS when 
compared to typical disputes under BITs. In the BIT context, the ISDS 
normally involves applying the dispute resolution procedure in lieu of  resort 
to the host state’s courts. In the Cape Town context, the ISDS mechanism 
(binding arbitration) often would be invoked after resorting to the courts. 
Under Cape Town, court relief  might first be sought to enforce remedies 
against the debtor. Then the ISDS enforcement mechanism could later be 
invoked to provide a remedy against the allegedly offending 
Contracting State. 
b. Scope: Covered (Protected) Creditors 
The discussion has proceeded thus far on the basis of  the favorable 
comparisons between typical BITs and Cape Town in the context of  the 
underlying economic rationales. BITs generally protect only foreign 
investors, however, not national or domestic investors. Cape Town, on the 
other hand, provides rights and remedies to creditors irrespective of  a 
creditor’s nationality and is not limited to the protection of  foreign 
creditors. This raises the question whether creditors that would be entitled 
to utilize an ISDS under Cape Town should be limited to those situated in a 
Contracting State other than the Contracting State that has (or is alleged to 
have) failed to comply with its Cape Town obligations (i.e., limited to 
“foreign” creditors). I have not yet formed an opinion on this question. But 
it is one which a Review Conference would likely be called upon 
to consider. 
c. Implementation Provision 
An amendment also could provide a declaration mechanism that would 
be directed toward overcoming implementation problems. Under this 
approach, a state could make a declaration to the following effect with 
respect to the covered Cape Town obligations: “The obligations of  
[Contracting State] with respect to the provisions of  the Convention and 
the Protocol[s] listed below are effective and binding on the government of  
[Contracting State], including its courts and other tribunals and its officials, 
immediately upon the entry into force of  the [Cape Town amendment] in 
respect of  the government of  [Contracting State], without further 
executive, legislative, or administrative action or implementation of  any 
kind and notwithstanding any conflicting rule of  law under the laws of  
[Contracting State].” The extent to which such a provision and declaration 
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would or would not overcome implementation problems in any particular 
state is beyond the scope of  this Essay.118 
d. Structure of  ISDS for Award of  Damages 
Given the unique aspects of  an ISDS in the Cape Town context it is 
undoubtedly the case that ISDS under various BITs would not provide 
ideal examples. Even so, considering a prospective Cape Town ISDS in the 
context of  typical BIT dispute resolution arrangements will provide helpful 
examples and a checklist of  considerations. For this purpose, the 2012 U.S. 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012 Model BIT) offers a useful point 
of  departure.119 
As with any well-drawn “arbitration clause,” an amendment under Cape 
Town should identify the disputes that would be subject to the ISDS. To do 
so in the context of  Cape Town, it should specify the obligations of  a 
Contracting State the breach of  which would be within the scope of  
binding arbitration. A starting point for this list has been mentioned above 
in Part II.A.3.a. 
Consider next the temporal dimension of  an ISDS. Section B of  the 
2012 Model BIT requires a claimant to first attempt to resolve a dispute by 
consultation and negotiation.120 It further provides that at least ninety days 
before a claimant submits a claim to arbitration, the claimant must deliver 
to the respondent written notice of  its intention to submit the claim, and 
Section B specifies the required content of  this notice.121 The notice is, in 
effect, the claimant’s “pleading” in which it states its claim. Finally, a 
claimant may submit a claim to arbitration only after “six months have 
elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim.”122 A Review Conference 
would have to consider whether time restrictions similar to those provided 
by the 2012 Model BIT (which are typical) would be appropriate. Given the 
                                                          
118. Because the relationship between a treaty and national domestic law is a matter governed by 
the national law, states may differ in their treatment of  a treaty provision such as the one set out in the 
text. See ROY GOODE ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
AND COMMENTARY 2 (2d ed. 2012) (“Domestic law, usually constitutional in nature, determines 
whether and the extent to which a treaty needs to be incorporated or otherwise transformed into 
domestic law by further act.”). I note in passing that if  a Review Conference were to be convened it 
also would present the opportunity to rectify any drafting errors or “glitches” in the texts of  Cape 
Town, without opening the door for the reconsideration of  basic policy issues resolved by Cape Town. 
119. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATY (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Model BIT]. For an analysis of  whether a violation of  a state’s Cape 
Town obligations could trigger an investor claim under the 2012 Model BIT, see Havel & Mulligan, 
supra note 18, at 92–93. 
120. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 119, art. 23. 
121. Id. art. 24(2). 
122. Id. art. 24(3). The 2012 Model BIT also provides for a statute of  limitations under which 
claims may not be submitted to arbitration “if  more than three years have elapsed from the date on 
which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of  the breach alleged.” Id. 
art. 26(1). 
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discrete provisions of  Cape Town that would be appropriate for 
submission to arbitration, when compared to the broad protections 
generally provided by BITs, it may be that the time-frames for notice and 
submission to arbitration could be considerably shorter. 
Under the 2012 Model BIT a claimant may submit a claim to arbitration 
under one of  three sets of  rules: (i) under the International Centre for 
Settlement of  Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the ICSID 
Rules of  Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings,123 (ii) under the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules,124 or (iii) under the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules.125 In addition, 
the claimant and respondent may agree to use other arbitration institutions 
or rules.126 The 2012 Model BIT’s approach would be quite plausible for an 
amendment to the Convention and the three Protocols as there does not 
appear to be anything about a dispute under Cape Town that would require 
rules that deviate from those typically applied in binding arbitration 
under BITs.127 
An amendment should be clear as to when a breach of  a Contracting 
State’s Cape Town obligation accrues. For example, if  the Contracting 
State’s court fails to provide a creditor with a Cape Town-mandated remedy, 
such a breach should provide the creditor with a remedy under the ISDS — 
subject of  course to applicable timing requirements on notification and 
submission to arbitration. The creditor should not be required to pursue 
appellate or other additional proceedings. The Contracting State’s judicial 
system having (allegedly) failed the test, the creditor’s rights under the 
amendment should be triggered. 
The amendment also could resolve many aspects of  an ISDS by 
adopting the approach taken in various other contexts in Cape Town, 
allowing discretion through the use of  declarations. For example, as to the 
timing issues discussed above, a Contracting State could in a declaration 
                                                          
123. Id. art. 24(3)(a); INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID], Rules of  Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, at 99, 
ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (2006). The claimant may choose the ICSID Rules only if  the respondent state 
and the “non-disputing Party” (i.e., the claimant’s home state) are parties to the ICSID Convention. Id. 
at 5. 
124. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 119, art. 24(3)(b); ICSID, ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES, 
ICSID Doc. No. ICSID/11 (2006). The claimant may choose the Additional Facility Rules only if  
either of  the respondent or the non-disputing Party is a party to the ICSID Convention. 
125. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 119, art. 24(3)(c); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (2014), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-
Rules-2013-e.pdf. 
126. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 119, art. 24(3)(d). 
127. Of  course, the same holds true for various other aspects of  an ISDS under Cape Town, such 
as the selection of  arbitrators that will compose the arbitral tribunal. For example, the 2012 Model 
BIT provides for the claimant and respondent each to name an arbitrator and for a third, the presiding 
arbitrator, to be appointed by agreement between the claimant and respondent. Id. art. 27(1). 
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select from a menu of  alternative time limits or simply specify a time limit 
that it chooses to adopt.128 Similarly, a Contracting State that found one set 
of  arbitration rules to be unacceptable could declare that claimants against 
it could not choose those rules. The same approach could be taken for the 
identification of  the obligations covered by the ISDS and for other details. 
While the ISDS applicable to any particular Contracting State must be clear, 
it would not be necessary for every Contracting State to be subject to an 
identical regime. 
A final consideration to be addressed here is the relief  that should be 
available under a Cape Town ISDS. Under the 2012 Model BIT, a “tribunal 
may award, separately or in combination, only: (a) monetary damages and 
any applicable interest; and (b) restitution of  property.”129 In the case of  
restitution, however, the award must “provide that the respondent may pay 
monetary damages and any applicable interest in lieu of  restitution.”130 It 
follows that a respondent state could not be ordered to take any specific 
action other than restitution and even then it would have the option to pay 
damages. A Cape Town regime could provide that a Contracting State in 
breach of  its covered obligations may be ordered to comply. For example, it 
could provide that an arbitral award could require the debtor to turn over 
an object to the creditor. Additionally, it could even provide that such an 
arbitral award could be specifically enforced in a court of  the Contracting 
State. This outcome is highly unlikely though, because it is doubtful 
whether Contracting States would agree to give an arbitral tribunal that 
degree of  power. As a practical matter, relief  would likely be limited to 
damages. The ISDS would not function as an in-kind substitute for the 
rights and remedies to which a creditor is entitled under Cape Town. 
However, the 2012 Model BIT does provide that “[a] tribunal may also 
award costs and attorney’s fees in accordance with this Treaty and the 
applicable arbitration rules.”131 It further requires each state party to 
“provide for the enforcement of  an award in its territory.”132 One might 
expect a similar package of  provisions relating to awards in a Cape 
Town ISDS. 
While a thorough analysis of  all of  the issues that must be addressed 
when fashioning a Cape Town ISDS to provide for binding arbitration is 
beyond the scope of  this Essay, the foregoing provides some examples of  
how BIT ISDS can inform the Cape Town ISDS discussion. It also 
                                                          
128. The latter approach was taken with respect to Aircraft Protocol Article XI for the relevant 
time period. Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, arts. XI(3) (Alternative A), XI(2) (Alternative B), XXX(3). 
129. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 119, art 34(1). 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. art. 34(7). 
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suggests some respects in which a Cape Town regime may need to find its 
own path. 
B. Current Debates on BITs and Investor-State Enforcement: Red Herring 
In some quarters “BIT” is a “four-letter word.”133 The UN Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) noted in 2012 that the negotiation 
of  IIAs, including BITs, “continues to lose momentum.”134 It attributed 
this development in part to “a gradual shift towards regional treaty 
making.”135 More pertinent to this discussion, it pointed to “the fact that 
IIAs are becoming increasingly controversial and politically sensitive, 
primarily owing to the spread of  IIA-based investor-state arbitrations.”136 
For example, in 2011, Australia announced that it would no longer include 
ISDS provisions in its IIAs.137 Also in 2011, Bolivia denounced its BIT with 
the United States.138 In 2012, Venezuela announced its plan to withdraw 
from the ICSID Convention — an action already taken by both Bolivia and 
Ecuador.139 Argentina has refused to pay large and long-outstanding arbitral 
awards to United States firms.140 Moreover, in the past several years there 
has been a substantial and rapid increase in the number of  ISDS cases.141 
This may be attributable to increased investor awareness (and that of  their 
counsel), significant increases in foreign direct investment, states’ “reassertion 
of  their role in regulating and steering the economy, as implemented through a 
number of  national regulatory changes,” and “[i]ncreased nationalizations, 
especially in Latin America” (Venezuela and Argentina being examples).142 
As UNCTAD has summarized: “Over time, the public discourse about the 
usefulness and legitimacy of  the ISDS mechanism has been gaining 
momentum, sometimes taking place at the national level . . . and sometimes 
having an international dimension . . . .”143 
For those of  the BIT-is-a-four-letter-word persuasion, the suggestion of  
adding an ISDS to Cape Town (or anything else) prompts a knee-jerk 
                                                          
133. For readers unfamiliar with this idiom, see Four-Letter Word, DICTIONARY.COM 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/four-letter+word (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (defining “four-
letter word” as “any of  a number of  short words, usually of  four letters, considered offensive or 
vulgar because of  their reference to excrement or sex” and as “any word, typically of  four letters, that 
represents something forbidden, disliked, or regarded with extreme distaste”). 
134. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF 
INVESTMENT POLICIES, at 84, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.3 (2012). 
135. Id. 
136. Id.  
137. Id. at 87. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 86. 
142. Id. (emphasis in original). 
143. Id. at 88 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
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reaction — the idea is a non-starter. However, the serious criticisms of  BITs 
and other IIAs, including their use of  ISDS, do not apply in the context of  
an ISDS for Cape Town. I take no side here in the BIT/ISDS debate and 
need not do so in order to support serious consideration of  an ISDS for 
Cape Town. 
To make the point, the following discussion examines a potential Cape 
Town ISDS from the perspective of  one of  the harshest critical evaluations 
of  investment arbitration to date — Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, 
Arbitrators and Financiers Are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom 
(“Profiting”).144 Although this article reads more like a polemical rant than an 
objective assessment, it still serves as a useful framework for identifying 
some of  the evils that people have associated with investment arbitration.145 
The following discussion first summarizes the principal theses on which 
Profiting’s critique is based. It then explains why the critique, even assuming 
it is warranted on the merits, would not apply to a Cape Town ISDS. 
The overarching theme of  Profiting is that investment arbitration does 
not provide an independent and fair dispute resolution process,146 because 
it has become a lucrative industry that is dominated by lawyers and law 
firms147 (as well as arbitrators148) primarily motivated by a profit incentive. 
                                                          
144. PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, CORPORATE EUR. OBSERVATORY & TRANSNATIONAL 
INST., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE 
FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (2012), available at 
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf. Profiting was 
published by Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and Transnational Institute (TI). CEO’s website 
explains that it “is a research and campaign group working to expose and challenge the privileged 
access and influence enjoyed by corporations and their lobby groups in EU policy making.” About 
CEO, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY, http://corporateeurope.org/about-ceo (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
It lists one of  the authors, Pia Eberhardt, as a member of  its staff. Id. TI’s website notes that “[i]t 
carries out radical informed analysis on critical global issues, builds alliances with social movements 
and develops proposals for a more sustainable, just and democratic world.” Introduction, TRANSNAT’L 
INST. (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.tni.org/page/introduction. It lists the other author, Cecilia Olivet, 
as a member of  its staff. Staff, TRANSNAT’L INST., http://www.tni.org/staff  (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2015). 
145. There are, of  course, other critiques that employ more balanced and objective assessments. 
See, e.g., AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2013); 
Christopher M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of  International 
Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 725 (2008). 
146. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 144, at 11 (“[T]he alleged fairness and independence of  
investment arbitration is an illusion.”).  
147. See, e.g., id. at 18–33 (Chapter 3, “Legal Vultures: Driving Demand for Investment 
Arbitration”). This chapter discusses, inter alia, the lucrative nature of  the business for the twenty 
busiest investment arbitration law firms, how these law firms create de facto barriers to entry into that 
business, their familiarity with the arbitrators, how governments are frightened into submission by 
threats of  investment disputes, and the lobbying of  lawyers to deter treaty reforms. 
148. See, e.g., id. at 34–55 (Chapter 4, “Who Guards the Guardians? The Conflicting Interests of  
Investment Arbitrators”). This chapter discusses, inter alia, the strong financial interests of  arbitrators 
in investment arbitration which undermines their neutrality, that repeat-player arbitrators are members 
of  an informal “club” or “inner circle,” how arbitrators and lawyer tend to “shun” those who are 
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This theory is used to explain the enormous growth in the numbers of  
cases brought using ISDS frameworks, the huge damage awards, and the 
staggering attorney and arbitrator fees.149 It also argues that real and 
potential conflicts of  interests among arbitrators and attorneys, as well as 
the familiarity of  the specialized arbitration attorneys with the repeat-player 
arbitrators, have encouraged the increase in numbers of  cases and the size 
of  awards.150 
In addition to this main thesis, Profiting argues that BITs and other IIAs 
that provide for investment arbitration were imposed on the states that now 
are suffering the consequences.151 Another theme highlights how 
investment arbitration serves as an assault on governments’ social policies. 
“For law firms looking to maximise profits from arbitration, state 
regulations to protect the environment, public health and social security 
have become lucrative business opportunities.”152 Profiting highlights a 
number of  examples that exemplify its claims and which demonstrate the 
enormous reach and breadth of  BITs and other IIAs. Philip Morris sued 
Uruguay and Australia under BITs, claiming damages from those states’ 
respective anti-smoking laws.153 Vattenfall (Swedish energy firm) sued 
Germany for 1.4 billion Euro over environmental restrictions placed on 
coal-fired power plants.154 Vattenfall also sued Germany for 3.7 billion 
Euro for lost profits from its nuclear power plants after Germany decided 
to phase out the use of  nuclear energy following the disaster in 
Fukushima.155 Many firms brought cases against Argentina based on its 
freezing of  utility rates and devaluation of  currency during its 2001–2002 
financial crisis.156 
The foregoing sketch of  Profiting’s theses and conclusions is sufficient 
for the present purposes of  considering its critique in the context of  a 
Cape Town ISDS. BITs and many other IIAs with investment arbitration 
mechanisms cover a broad range of  protections that affect enormously 
varied types of  investments reaching across a state’s entire economy. Cape 
                                                                                                                                       
critical of  the system, and the fifteen arbitrators who have decided fifty-five percent of  the investment 
treaty disputes. 
149. Id. at 13–15 (discussing growth of  investment arbitration industry and fees of  arbitrators 
and lawyers). 
150. See supra notes 147–48. 
151. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 144, at 11 (“Historically, [the treaties] were put in place by 
Western governments wanting to protect their companies when they invested abroad.”). 
152. Id. at 24. 
153. Id. at 13. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 13, 27. Both Vattenfall cases were brought under the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty, 
which makes provision for investor arbitration similar to provisions found in typical BITs. Id. at 13; see 
Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 16. 
156. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 144, at 13, 19 (“By the end of  2008, awards against . . . 
[Argentina] had reached a total of  US$1.15 billion.”) (footnote omitted)). 
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Town, on the other hand, does not. Cape Town addresses only discrete 
items of  mobile equipment and related associated rights with respect to 
which debtors have voluntarily entered into contractual arrangements to 
create international interests governed by its asset-based financing and 
leasing regime. The obligations of  Contracting States under Cape Town are 
likewise discrete and precisely targeted to the realization of  the rights and 
remedies inherent in asset-based financing and leasing. 
Not only is the reach of  Cape Town’s targeted and discrete regime 
wholly unlike that of  typical BITs, but the occurrence of  a creditor’s 
exercise of  remedies, and thereby the most likely potential for a 
Contracting State to run afoul of  its obligations, is likely to be a highly 
unusual and infrequent event. The nine-plus years since the Convention 
and the Aircraft Protocol entered into force have generally supported 
this prediction.157  
From these unique features, it is difficult to imagine how a Cape Town 
ISDS could present any realistic potential for interference with a 
Contracting State’s public health and safety, environmental, social welfare, 
or other regulatory domains. It also follows that it is equally unimaginable 
that a lucrative industry providing enormous economic benefits to lawyers 
and arbitrators would emerge from the adoption of  a Cape Town ISDS. 
A BIT regime and Cape Town are alike in their common purpose — to 
induce investment.158 Were an amendment to incorporate an ISDS for Cape 
Town there would be a second common attribute — the provision for 
binding investor-state arbitration. But a binding investor-state arbitration 
regime under Cape Town would nonetheless be distinguishable from that 
under a BIT in the context of  the impairment of  a state’s sovereignty. If  
BITs were “put in place by Western governments” as Profiting asserts,159 
presumably that was a product of  unequal bargaining power. This would 
not be the case if  a Cape Town ISDS were adopted. Instead the 
Convention, the Aircraft Protocol, and any future Protocol or amendment 
would reflect a multilateral convention which many Contracting States 
willingly joined in order to achieve the benefits of  lower-cost financing 
and leasing. 
 
                                                          
157. Convention — Status, supra note 11; Aircraft Protocol — Status, supra note 11. 
158. See supra Part I.A. of  this Essay. Whether and to what extent BITs have fulfilled this purpose 
is not clear. Compare Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 89, at 90, 106–07, 111 (finding that BITs generally 
have been successful in reaching the goals of  protecting investors and thereby promoting investment), 
with Yackee, supra note 89, at 438 (“BITs generally have little causal role in promoting foreign 
investment.”). It does seem clear, based on the operation of  the ASU and the CTC Discount, that the 
Convention and the Aircraft Protocol have succeeded in this respect. See supra Part I.A. of  this Essay. 
159. EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 144, at 11. 
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C. Feasibility of  a Convention Amendment on Investor-State Enforcement: Should 
the Problem Be Addressed? 
Given Cape Town’s economic rationale of  providing lower-cost 
financing and leasing, there should be no principled objection to including 
an ISDS feature in Cape Town. ISDS provisions could only increase the ex 
ante market confidence that Contracting States would comply with their 
Cape Town obligations.160 Any objections based on sovereignty also fail. As 
already explained, even if  an amendment adding an ISDS feature were 
approved by a Review Conference, the amendment would bind a 
Contracting State only upon its ratification, acceptance, or approval of  the 
amendment. Consequently, any plausible objections must be based on the 
feasibility of  the project, not the likely consequences of  creating an ISDS 
feature for Cape Town. This Subpart discusses the feasibility question. 
The principal test for feasibility of  the project would be whether there 
would exist sufficient state support for including an ISDS feature in Cape 
Town.161 Part of  the states’ attitudes could turn on the level of  interest in 
and priority of  such a project within the UNIDROIT Secretariat and 
Governing Council, which in turn would be influenced by scarce resources 
and competing demands for funding and time commitments. The support 
of  states and UNIDROIT162 for such a project could be influenced 
substantially by prevailing views on the question of  whether there really are 
compliance problems that should be addressed. Given imperfect data and 
the absence of  a functional crystal ball,163 if  and when states are asked to 
weigh in on that question they will have to make their best assessment 
under the circumstances. Even if  there were a consensus that such 
problems exist and should be addressed, states (and UNIDROIT) also 
would be called upon to consider whether a substantial number of  
Contracting States would have any interest in adopting an amendment 
incorporating an ISDS feature. Notwithstanding the argument made 
above,164 some states may take the view that BIT investor-state arbitration 
is so toxic that an ISDS project would never get off  the ground. 
                                                          
160. See, e.g., Wool, Compliance, supra note 63, at 21 (“[I]f  [a] treaty[ ] imposes binding legal 
consequences for noncompliance (such as arbitration initiated by [a] party[ ]), compliance is 
more likely.”). 
161. Consider the requirement of  twenty-five percent of  the Contracting States necessary even to 
call for a Review Conference and the two-thirds majority necessary for the approval of  an 
amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 95–97. 
162. I do not know whether ICAO would have an interest in pursuing with UNIDROIT an ISDS 
amendment. But if  ICAO wished to maintain the partnership formed with UNIDROIT in developing 
the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol, then its interest would have to be taken into account 
as well. 
163. See supra Part I.C. of  this Essay (discussing whether there is a compliance problem). 
164. See supra Part II.B. of  this Essay. 
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Why would — or should — a Contracting State have any interest in 
adopting an ISDS regime for Cape Town? Clearly its adoption would 
contribute credible evidence of  the state’s intention to comply with its Cape 
Town obligations. But would that provide sufficient marginal benefits? If  it 
turns out that the credit markets were to perceive sufficient risks of  non-
compliance with Cape Town obligations, then the ASU might be modified 
to provide additional benefits (by way of  reductions in financing costs) for 
states that adopt an ISDS regime. One approach would be for the ASU to 
treat the adoption as a qualifying declaration. Some states with a less than 
pristine compliance history, which may not have qualified for the CTC 
Discount (or which may have lost it), might adopt the ISDS feature in order 
to repair their reputations. Clearly consultation would be needed to 
determine the marginal benefits each country could receive under an ISDS 
framework; however, it would be unfortunate if  the ISDS proposal offered 
here were simply dismissed without further serious consideration. 
Some feasibility considerations are the same as those that would be 
involved in a project to develop an international secured transactions 
registry of  general application, addressed in Part One of  this essay series.165 
These include the opportunity costs to UNIDROIT of  pursuing an ISDS 
project, presumably to the exclusion of  other potential projects. 
Additionally, there are substantial costs involved with a preliminary study166 
and with holding the sessions of  a Review Conference to finalize an 
amendment. However, these costs may be mitigated by ongoing 
developments. The UNIDROIT Governing Council has approved a 
preliminary study of  the potential for a Fourth Protocol for Cape Town to 
cover mining, agricultural, and construction equipment (dubbed “MAC 
equipment”).167 The Study Group held its first and second meetings at 
UNIDROIT headquarters in Rome from December 15–17, 2014, and April 
8–9, 2015.168 If  the Study Group were supportive of  an ISDS for the 
Fourth Protocol and included such a feature in a preliminary draft protocol, 
then it could be considered during subsequent governmental experts 
meetings and, eventually, at a diplomatic conference. A Review Conference 
could be convened to consider adding an ISDS for the Convention and its 
three existing Protocols during the course of  those meetings. In this 
fashion, an ISDS amendment project could free-ride on the MAC project. 
While this approach might require adding a few extra days to the meeting 
                                                          
165. See Mooney, Jr., Part One, supra note 6, at 181–85. 
166. However, as already mentioned, two or three individuals might be assigned the preparation of  
an initial draft accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. See supra Part II.A.2. of  this Essay. 
167. UNIDROIT, Rep. of  the Governing Council, 93d Sess., May 7–10, 2014, C.D. (93) 14 (2014). 
168. Study LXXII K — Development of a Fourth Protocol to the Cape Town Convention on Matters Specific to 
Agricultural, Construction and Mining Equipment, UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/work-in-
progress-studies/current-studies/mac-protocol (last updated Apr. 13, 2015).  
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schedules, it would still drastically reduce the costs associated with a Review 
Conference when compared to those of  freestanding sessions.169  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has explored whether an ISDS feature for Cape Town is 
needed, plausible, and feasible. Adopting an ISDS for Cape Town would 
recognize that the extension of  credit through asset-based financing and 
leasing is an investment that requires protection just as does foreign direct 
investment covered by BITs and other IIAs. Increased protection induces 
the extension of  credit (investment). An ISDS component of  Cape Town 
could only enhance its effectiveness. 
The Essay also considered whether there are problems of  
implementation and compliance that would justify the costs of  adopting an 
amendment to Cape Town to create an ISDS, largely relying on the 
thorough and invaluable research, investigation, and analysis of  Jeffrey 
Wool. While it reaches no firm conclusion on this question, given the 
scarcity of  data, the Essay argued that it is too early to foreclose serious 
consideration of  a Cape Town ISDS. With hindsight, it was an unfortunate 
mistake that an ISDS for Cape Town was not addressed at the outset of  the 
negotiation process.170 
The Essay then turned to the substance of  a Cape Town ISDS. It 
outlined the potential scope and content of  an ISDS for Cape Town and 
explored the feasibility of  adopting an amendment to incorporate an ISDS 
into the Convention and its Protocols. It then explained that the criticisms 
leveled at ISDS for BITs and other IIAs would not be applicable to a Cape 
Town ISDS. 
Wholly aside from the prospect of  an ISDS for Cape Town, one 
overarching goal of  this Essay was to advance, introduce, and raise 
consciousness of  the idea of  an ISDS in a transnational commercial law 
regime outside the typical domain of  BITs and IIAs. As far as I know, this 
is a novel approach. As to whether the idea has legs, however, only time 
will tell. 
 
                                                          
169. There is some precedent for convening meetings in joint capacities. In 1999 and 2000 there 
were three joint sessions of  a UNIDROIT Committee of  Governmental Experts and a Sub-
Committee of  the ICAO Legal Committee. GOODE, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 7, at 6. This 
is not precisely what the approach suggested in the text would entail, however. 
170. I do not suggest that had the issue been addressed an ISDS feature would have emerged from 
the process. However, given the success of  Cape Town’s flexible approach toward permitted 
declarations and the widespread acceptance of  Aircraft Protocol Article XI, Alternative A, had the 
issue been raised it certainly is plausible that an optional ISDS would have emerged. 
